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THE CLASSIFICATION OF SOME POWERS
OF APPOINTMENT

Joseph Gold*

M

ANY problems involving powers of appointment depend for
their solution on the classification of the power in question as
general or special. It is now clearly established in English law and
in most American jurisdictions that this classification depends on the
persons to whom an appointment may be made. The fact that the
power is exercisable on a contingency 1 or in a specified manner 2 does
not affect the character of the power. Nor is it relevant for the purpose
of classification that the power permits the appointment of a limited
interest only. 8 A general power is usually said to be one which enables
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1 Wandesford v. Carrick, I. R. 5 Eq. 486 (1871); Charlton v. Attorney General,
4 App. Cas. 427 at 446 (1879); Forney's Estate, 280 Pa. 282, 124 A. 424 (1924);
In re Twitchell's Estate, 284 Pa. 135, 130 A. 324 (1925); Cowman v. Classen, 156
Md. 428, 144 A. 367 (1929); J. Gilmore Fletcher, Exr., 29 B. T. A. 503 (1933);
Johnstone v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 55. See, however,
Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughn, (D. C. Pa. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 987.
2
Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N. H. 298 (1844); Webb v. McCracken, 3 Comm.
L. R. (Aust. High Ct.) 1018 at 1024 (1906); Greenway v. White, 196 Ky. 745,
246 S. W. 137 (1922); Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn, (D. C. Pa. 1926) 15 F. (2d)
591 at 592, affd. (C. C. A. 3d, 1927) 21 F. (2d) 164; Lee v. Commissioner, (App.
D. C. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 399 at 401, cert. den., Lee v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 563, 52
S. Ct. 645 (1932).
8
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N. Y. 266 at 285, 85 N. E. 59 (1908);
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) 34 F. (2d) 600,
cert. den., 280 U. S. 602, 50 S. Ct. 85 (1929); Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
Exrs., 30 B. T. A. 287 at 290 (1934); Harry J. Brown, 38 B. T. A. 298 (1938);
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 at 83, 60 S. Ct. 424 (1940).
In the New York statutory system of powers, a power is not considered general
unless it enables the donee to appoint the whole fee. N. Y. Real Property Law, 49
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1937), §§ 134, 135. Some other states have adopted this
rule, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), §§ 12999, 13000, Stat. Ann. (Henderson,
1936), §§ 26.95, 26.96; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), §§ 8u1, 8II2; Wis. Stat.
(1939), §§ 232.05, 232.06. See also 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,§ 320 (1940), and
the cryptic remark in I CHANCE, TREATISE ON PowERS 43 1 ( 1841): "Sometimes a
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the donee of the power to appoint to anyone he pleases, including himself.4 A special power is usually defined as one which the donee may
exercise in favor of certain specified persons or classes.5 Sometimes it
is said that these specified persons or classes do not include the donee. 6
The courts have had considerable difficulty in determining the
nature of certain powers which do not fall squarely within the above
categories. Thus, a power to appoint to anybody except certain named
persons is not obviously general since it does not confer on the donee
complete freedom of choice in the selection of appointees, but it would
be absurd to hold that the possible appointees are specified individuals
or classes. A power to appoint to anybody except the donee raises a
similar problem. It does not comply with the traditional definition of
a general power since the donee cannot appoint to himself. On the
other hand, it cannot be said that exclusion _of the donee makes the
possible appointees a limited or defined class. A power to appoint to a
limited class which includes the donee is yet another example of the
weakness of the commonly accepted definitions.

I
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW

A. A Power to Appoint to a Limited Class which
Includes the Donee
Where the donor creates a power of appointment exercisable in
favor of a limited class, and the donee falls within the description of
the class, the problem at once arises whether the donee may appoint to
himself. If he cannot, there is no question as to the nature of the power.
It is obviously special.
power, though general in its objects, is expressly confined to the lives of the appointees;
various questions may arise on such a power."
4 2 CoKE ON LITTLETON, INSTITUTES, 17th ed., 271b, Butler's note VII.2
(1817); FARWELL, PowERs, 3d ed., 8 (1916): KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS,
2d ed., § 609 (1920); SUGDEN, PowERs, 8th ed., 394 (1861); 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 246 (1936); Re Dilke, [1921] I Ch. 34 at 41-42; Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78 at 81, 60 S. Ct. 424 (1940).
5
See note 4, supra, and Greenway v. White, 196 Ky. 745, 246 S. W. 137
(1922); Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288, 156 A. 84 (1931); Johnstone v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 55.
6
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78 at 81, 60 S. Ct. 424 (1940); Gray,
"Release and Discharge of Powers," 24 HARV. L. REv. 5 II at 512 ( I 9 n) ; Leach,
"Powers of Appointment," 24 A. B. A. J. 807 at 808 (1938); 1 SIMES, FUTURE
INTERESTS, § 246 (1936).
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In Wetmore v. Henry,7 an Illinois case, the testatrix devised and
bequeathed her residuary real and personal estate to her nephew, W,
on trust to distribute it among her heirs, of whom he was one, in such
shares as he should deem each of them worthy. W appointed part only
of the property before his death. The Supreme Court of Illinois held
that the power was in trust, and that it would, therefore, distribute
the property unappointed in equal shares among the objects, including
W. The will contained a provision that any property not distributed
by W within two years from the probate of the testatrix's will should
be deemed the proportion retained by W for himself, "as I have full
faith that he will not reserve more than his equitable share." The court
ordered the distribution because W had died within the two-year
period.
Wetmore v. Henry suggests that the donee, W, was able to appoint
to himself. A different view was taken in Re Lawler's Will,8 a New
York case. The residue of the testator's estate was given to the executor
to be distributed among certain named persons, of whom the executor
was one. The New York Supreme Court held that the donee must
either waive all right to take under the residuary clause or else refuse
to act as executor. The court followed Rogers v. Rogers,9 another New
York decision, in which case the testator left property to five executors,
or to such of them as should qualify, in trust for the maintenance of
certain beneficiaries, one of whom was the testator's wife. She was
also one of the executors, and she was, in fact, the only executor to
qualify. The court decided that it would itself administer the trust, and
that the wife could not act without its authorization.
In English law, the question whether the donee can appoint to himself is clearly settled. In an early case, Warburton v. W arburton,1°
the residue of the testator's personalty and £400 to be raised out of the
realty were given to two daughters of the testator, "to be disposed of
by them to the use of themselves, their brothers and sisters, or to such
of them and in such proportion, as they should judge most fit and convenient, according to their needs and necessities." The two daughters
argued that the power was wholly discretionary, and that they could,
therefore, appoint to themselves to the exclusion of their brothers and
sisters. The Lord Keeper, Sir Nathan Wright, rejected this argument,
and decreed that a double share should be appointed to the eldest son,
1

259 Ill. 80, 102 N. E. 189 (1913).
215 App. Div. 506, 213 N. Y. S. 723 (1926).
9
111 N. Y. 228, 18 N. E. 636 (1888).
10
2 Vern. 420, 23 Eng. Rep. 869, affd. 4 Bro. P. C. 1, 2 Eng. Rep. 1 (1702).
8
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the heir, "as looking upon him to stand most in need thereof." The
House of Lords confirmed this decree, but a century later Lord Alvanley 11 referred to Warburton v. Warburton as a "very extraordinary"
case.
". . . There the Lord Keeper Wright and the House of Lords
seem to have thought that the trust devolved upon the Court.
The reason is a very odd one. I hope 'they did not lay much stress
upon his being bred to the law. It is hardly to be collected, what
construction they put upon it. It seems, as if they exercised the
power themselves: a power, which of late the Court has disclaimed; and I hope, that will always be followed. If the power
is not executed properly, the rule now is to set aside the execution,
and give the fund equally. But I suppose, the construction there
was, that it was a general trust, to be exercised for their own
benefit; and therefore the Court was very jealous; and completely
controlled it." 12
It is not clear upon what ground Lord Alvanley disapproved the
Warburton case. It does not appear to be open to objection on the
ground that there was no rule laid down for the execution of the trust.
Where trustees are given a discretion which is to be exercised on matters of opinion and judgment, the court will not "substitute the master." But if the discretion is to be exercised on matters of fact, the
court will itself exercise the discretion if the trustees fail to exercise it
or exercise it improperly.18 There is a decision of Lord Hardwicke's 14
which shows that in Warburton v. Warburton there was that which
could be construed as a rule laid down for the execution of the trust,
or, in other words, the daughters were to exercise a discretion based on
matters of fact. Lord Hardwicke held that where there was a discretion
given to trustees to distribute a fund among the settlor's relatives where
the trustees should see most necessity and as they should think most
equitable and just, in such case there was a rule laid down for the exercise of the trustees' discretion which the court could itself apply on the
failure of the trustees to execute the trust.
" ..• here is a rule laid down.... The trustees are to judge on the
necessity and occasions of the family ...• That is a judgment to be
made on facts existing; so that the court can make the judgment
Kemp v. Kemp, 5 Ves. Jun. 849, 31 Eng. Rep. 891 (1801).
Id. at 859.
18
Walker v. Walker, 5 Madd. 424 at 426-427, 56 Eng. Rep. 957 (1820);
LEWIN, TRUSTS, 14th ed., 723~724 (1939).
14 Gower v. Mainwaring, 2 Ves, Sen. 87, 28 Eng. Rep. 57 (1750). But see SucDEN, PoWERS, 8th ed., 601 (1861).
11

12
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as well as the trustees; and when informed by evidence of the
necessity, can judge what is equitable and just on this necessity." 15

In another case 16 of the same year as the one from which this statement
is quoted, Lord Hardwicke said of Warburton v. Warburton that
"there was a rule prescribed by the testator for the exercise of the
discretion of the trustees, viz. according to their need and necessity."
Lord Alvanley's strictures may, however, be based upon another
ground. It can hardly be objected that in the Warburton case the power
was not in trust so that there was no ground for the intervention by the
court and its exercise of the power. Lord Alvanley seems to think that
there was a power coupled with a trust in that case. But he may have
objected to the case on the ground that the trustees had not shown any
intention to exercise their discretion improperly. The court's action,
therefore, unwarrantably deprived them of all discretion whatsoever.
The significance of Warburton v. Warburton is this: It is sometimes said that the characteristic feature of a general power is the
donee's ability to appoint to himself. In the Warburton case, the
daughters were empowered, prima facie at least, to appoint to themselves. That case, however, shows the weakness of any such inflexible
criterion. The court, by finding a trust and a rule laid down for its execution, limited, and perhaps completely destroyed, the ability of the
trustees to appoint to themselves. In fact, if Lord Alvanley's suggestion is correct, the court was eager to control the donees precisely because they were empowered to appoint to themselves. There are evidences of this tendency in other English cases 17 as well as in the two
New York decisions already cited.
Warburton v. Warburton does not decide that the donees were
unable to make any appointment to themselves. This was, however,
argued in Supple v. Lowson.18 The testatrix gave the residue of her
personal estate to her brother in trust to apply and dispose of it among
her relations in such shares as he in his discretion should judge proper.
It was argued that the donee should be deprived of his discretion because he was one of the relations, and, as a trustee, should have no part
of the property. Sir Thomas Sewell, M.R., refused to take this view,
holding that all relations were intended, and that the power was wholly
discretionary.
15

Id., 2 Ves. Sen. at 89.
Potter v. Chapman, Amb. 98 at 100, 27 Eng. Rep. 61 ( 17 50).
17
E.g., Read v. Snell, 2 Atk. 642, 26 Eng. Rep. 785 (1743).
18
Amb. 729, 27 Eng. Rep. 471 (1773).

16

34 2
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In the next two cases, however, the right of the ·donee to appoint
to himself was considered doubtful. It should be noted that in the
earlier of them the power was held to be one coupled with a trust. In
this case, Reid v. Reid,19 the trustees of a deed had a discretionary
power of distribution of a fund among a class of children who in default of appointment took equally. Originally there were five trustees,
one of whom was a: member of the designated class. After the death
of the last survivor of the five trustees, three new trustees were appointed, one of whom again, L, was a member of the class. These three
trustees appointed the fund, except for a minute part, among the surviving children, including L, in equal shares. It was claimed that the
appointment of the new trustees and the disposition of the property by
them were invalid. Sir John Romilly, M.R., inclined to the view that
the appointment by the donee to himself might constitute a fraud on
the power. In the course of argument he remarked:
" ... I have great difficulty in regard to the trustees. Is it a fraud
on a discretionary power to appoint the fund to yourself? If
£rn,ooo were settled on a class of children, in such portions as the
trustees or the survivor of them, or the executors or administrators
of such survivor, should think fit, and the executors of the surviving trustee thought fit to appoint two of the children trustees, who
thereupon appointed the whole fund to themselves, could that be
supported?" 20
The technique suggested by Romilly for limiting or eliminating the
right of a donee to appoint to himself is not the same as that adopted
in Warburton v. Warburton. In the earlier case the power was treated
as one coupled with a trust, for the execution of which, moreover, the
donor had provided a rule. The doctrine of fraud upon a power, however, applies to all special powers, whether imperative (i.e., in trust)
or not. There is a fraud upon a power where the power "has been exercised for a purpose, or with an intention, beyond the scope of or not
justified by the instrument creating the power." 21 In the words of
Farwell,22 "A person having a limited power, must exercise it bona
fide for the end designed; otherwise the execution is corrupt and void."
The test of bona fide exercise "for the end designed" obviously gives
the court more scope for controlling the donee than the approach
adopted in the Warburton case, which requires a finding of both a trust
19

30 Beav. 388, 54 Eng. Rep. 939 (1862).
Id. at 392.
21 Vatcher v. Paull, [1915] A. C. 372 at 378 (P. C.), per Lord Parker.
22 FARWELL, Pow1ms, 3d ed., 457 (1916).
20

1942
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and a rule laid down for its execution. In Reid v. Reid the Master
of the Rolls finally decided that both the appointment of the new
trustees and the appointment of the prop~rty were valid, but as to the
latter he confessed "I have more doubt." 28
In Re Sinclaire's Estate,2 4 an Irish case decided a few years after
Reid v. Reid, the testator devised and bequeathed his real and personal
property to his wife, her heirs, executors, and administrators and assigns, "in trust for her, my said wife, and the children of our marriage,
in such shares and proportions, and in such manner and form to all
intents and purposes, as she shall by any deed or instrument in her
lifetime, or by her last will and testament, or any codicil or codicils
thereto, direct, limit or appoint." The wife appointed the whole property to N, his heirs and assigns, to hold it in trust for her, her heirs
and assigns. Lynch, J., stated that the question whether the wife could
appoint to herself was one of construction, but indicated that he would
be reluctant to find that she was so empowered.
"· .. whether, assuming a parent to be at once the donee, and one
of the objects of such a power as this, that power could be well
executed by the donee giving to himself the whole fund with a
nominal exception, raises a question on which I do not express an
opinion, but which I should hesitate to decide in the affirmative." 25
He held that it was not a natural construction in the case before him
that the widow was empowered to appoint to herself to the total exclusion of the children. This conclusion was in part based upon the
doubtful ground that she was empowered to appoint by deed or will.
This was taken to indicate that the appointees must be persons to whom
an appointment could be made both by deed and will. She could not
appoint to herself by will. This reasoning ignores the fact that if the
power were general she could appoint by will to her estate. 26 Moreover, the assumption that the appointees must be persons to whom an
appointment could be made by both will and deed seems to be an
obvious disregard of the testator's true intention. Finally, this assump28

30 Beav. 388 at 393, 54 Eng. Rep. 415 (1860).

u I. R. 2 Eq. 45 (1868).

Id. at 47.
Daniel v. Dudley, I Ph. 1, 41 Eng. Rep. 531 (1841); Attorney General v.
Malkin, 2 Ph. 64, 41 Eng. Rep. 866 (1845); Mackenzie v. Mackenzie, 3 Mac. & G.
559, 42 Eng. Rep. 376 (1851); Page v. Soper, II Hare 321, 68 Eng. Rep. 1298
{1853); Brickenden v. Williams, L. R. 7 Eq. 310 {1869); Bristow v. Skirrow, L. R.
10 Eq. I at 4 (1870). Cf. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Adams, 107 Misc. 639, 177 N. Y. S.
889 (1919).
25

26
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tion would disentitle the widow to any part of the property; its effect
is more than simply to secure part of the property to the other designated objects. If this is correct, one might well ask what the testator
had in mind in including the wife among the objects.
Re Sinclaire's Estate illustrates a third technique which courts may
employ to exercise control over donees who are included among designated objects. In Warburton v. Warburton this was done by finding
a trust and a rule for its execution. In Reid v. Reid it was suggested
that an appointment by the donee to himself might amount to a fraud
on the power. In the Sinclaire case the court limited the donee's power
to appoint to herself by an "interpretation" of the power.
The next case in the chronological consideration of the present
problem was the first which clearly and unequivocally laid it down
that the solution depends on no more than an interpretation of the
donor's intention. In Taylor v. Allhusen 21 it was provided that trust
funds should in certain events be held in trust for such persons and in
such manner as the donee should by deed appoint, so only that any
appointment should be made to a grandchild· or grandchildren of the
donee's paternal grandfather. The issue in this case was whether it was
competent for the donee to appoint to herself. Kekewich, J ., stressed
the fact that this question must always depend on the interpretation
of the particular instrument involved. He agreed with Farwell 28 that
there is no rule of law disabling a donee from appointing to himself
when he falls within the description of those designated by the donor
as objects. In deciding that the donee was here able to appoint to herself, he devoted much attention to the fact that there was a gift over
to her on default of appointment. Notwithstanding this obviously
sensible approach, it was again argued a few years later 29 that the
donee of a limited power who is included within the description of the
objects is absolutely debarred from appointing to himself. It was,
however, unnecessary to pass upon this question because the power itself
was void.
Re Penrose 80 involves the most recent statement on the question.
Luxmoore, J ., accepted the view of Farwell and Kekewich, J ., that the
donee's power to appoint to himself must always depend on the donor's
intention, and this, of course, depends on the interpretation of the in27 [1905] 1 Ch. 529. Cf. Re Skidmore's Estate, 148 Misc. 569, 266 N. Y. S.
312 (1933).
28
FARWELL, POWERS, 2d ed., 492 (1893), 3d ed., 556 (1916).
29
Tharp v. Tharp, [1916] 1 Ch. 142.
so [1933] Ch. 793·
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strument by which the power was conferred. Any inference to the contrary deducible from dicta in Re Sinclaire's Estate must be considered
incorrect.
" ... Quite apart from the decision in Taylor v. Allhusen, I should
have come to the conclusion that there is nothing illegal per se
in an appointment by a donee of a power in favour of a limited
class of persons appointing to himself if on the true construction
of the instrument creating the power the donee is himself a member of the class and not excluded from it." 81
He also rejected the argument, upon which much reliance was placed
in Re Sinclaire's Estate, that because the power was exercisable by deed
or will, therefore it must be predicated of each appointee that an appointment could be made to him by both deed and will. Luxmoore, J .,
held that the donee really had two powers, one exercisable by deed and
the other by will, and he could exercise whichever he considered appropriate to the occasion.
Once it is decided that the donee may appoint to himself, the
question then arises whether this makes the power general. There is
very little authority on this matter. In Thayer v. Rivers 82 the testatrix
gave to her children life estates and testamentary powers to appoint
the property in which they had life estates among her "lineal heirs,"
which description covered the children themselves. A daughter, in
attempted exercise of the power, gave life estates to such of her two
nieces and a nephew as should survive her, with power after their
respective deaths to appoint by will. The nephew survived his aunt and
appointed to his wife for life and after her death to his children in
equal shares. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held_ that the
appointment of life interests to the nephew and nieces was good, but
the rest was bad because it authorized appointments other than those
contemplated in the original testatrix's will. In other words, the powers
conferred by the daughter were void because there was no limitation
of the objects to the lineal heirs. This decision implies that the power
conferred by the original testatrix on her children was special, since if
it were general it would have permitted the donees to confer another
power thereunder. 83
81

Id. at 805.
179 Mass. 280, 60 N. E. 796 (1901).
38
See FARWELL, PowERs, 3d ed., 505 (1916); I S1MEs, FUTURE INTERESTS, §
264 (1936); SUGDEN, PowERs, 8th ed., 180-181 (1861); 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§ 357-359 (1940); 50 HARV. L. REv. 938 (1937); White v. Wilson, I
Drew. 298, 61 Eng. Rep. 466 (1852); Lloyd v. Lloyd, 26 Beav. 96, 53 Eng. Rep.
32
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In Taylor v. Allhusen, Kekewich, J., frequently refers to the power
there involved as general, but he does not discuss the problem of the
nature of the power, the only question before him being one of interpretation. Re Penrose has some bearing on the problem of classifying
powers of the kind here discussed. In this case, the testatrix devised and
bequeathed all her residuary real and personal estate to trustees upon
trust to pay the income to her husband for life and from and after his
death upon trust for any of the issue of her father or her husband's
father, immediate or remote, or any charitable purpose, as her husband should by deed or will appoint. After the husband's death, the
Commissioners of Inland Revenue claimed that estate duty was payable on the property subject to the power under both the wife's will and
the husband's will on the ground that by means of the power the husband was "competent to dispose" of the property within the meaning
of section 5 (2) of the Finance Act, r894.34 Section 22 (2) of that act
provides that
" ... A person shall be deemed competent to dispose of property
if he has such an estate or interest therein or such general power
as would, if he were sui juris, enable him to dispose of the property ... and the expression 'general power' includes every power
or authority enabling the donee or other holder thereof to appoint
or dispose of property as he thinks fit, whether exercisable by
instrument inter vivos or by will, or both. . . ."
It was argued on behalf of one of the appointees, a son, that the power
of appointment was special and not within the above provisions. The
donee had not been authorized to appoint as he thought fit, it was
contended, and if he appointed to himself, he was thereby acquiring the
property and not disposing of it. The power to dispose of it as he
thinks fit arises not under the power of appointment, but after it has
been exercised by the donee in his own favor. It was held that this
was too narrow a construction to put upon section 22 ( 2). The donee of
833 (1858); Carr v. Atkinson, L. R. 14 Eq. 397 (1872); Webb v. Sadler, L. R. 8
Ch. 419 (1873); Williamson v. Farwell, 35 Ch. D. 128 (1887); Frear v. Pugsley, 9
Misc. 316, 30 N. Y. S. 149 (1894); Mays v. Beech, II4 Tenn. 544, 86 S. W. 713
(1905); Re Greenslade, [1915] l Ch. 155; Cheever v. Cheever, 172 App. Div. 353,
157 N. Y. S. 428 (1916); Lehman v. Spicer, 108 Misc. 721, 176 N. Y. S. 445
(1919), a.ffd., 188 App. Div. 931, 176 N. Y. S. 445 (1919); Bucknell's Estate,
29Pa. D. 631 (1920); Re Dilke, [1921] 1 Ch. 34; Re May's Settlement, [1926]
Ch. 136; Re Boulton's Settlement Trust, [1928] Ch. 703; Re Mewburn's Settlement,
[1934] Ch. u2. Cf. De Charette v. De Charette, 264 Ky. 525, 94 S. W. (2d) 1018
(1936).
34
57 & 58 Viet., c. 30 (1894).
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a power who can freely appoint the whole of the property to himself
must be deemed competent to dispose of that property as he thinks fit.
It makes no difference that this freedom of disposition arises only after
the preliminary stage of an appointment by the donee to himself. But
Luxmoore, J., also went on to indicate that his view rested on an interpretation of the language of the section. The word "power" in the
phrase "a power to appoint or dispose of as he thinks fit" is not used
in the strict legal meaning attaching to it when used with reference to
a power of appointment. This is made clear, said Luxmoore, J., by the
use of the words "or dispose of" in addition to the words "to appoint,"
because otherwise the former phrase would be mere surplusage.
It would be unsafe to generalize too freely from the meagre case
law involving powers to appoint to a limited class which includes the
donee. The question whether a donee may appoint to himself in such
a case seems quite clearly, in England at least, to be one of construction. Some of the cases, however, do indicate a reluctance on the part
of the courts to find that the donee is empowered to appoint to himself.
If the donee is able to appoint to himself, the question which may then
arise, i.e., whether the power is general or special, is more doubtful.
It is sometimes said that a power is general if it permits the donee to
appoint to himself. There is much to be said for the view that it is
artificial to hold that the donee has not the complete freedom of disposition which he would certainly have if his choice were originally
unrestricted merely because he must adopt the formality of an appointment to himself first. To insist that the power is special because his
choice of objects is limited does appear to stress the form rather than
the substance of the power. Re Penrose supports the view that substantially the donee has complete freedom of disposition, although
Luxmoore, J., is careful to restrict his decision to the relevant sections
of the English Finance Act. Moreover, the Restatement of the Law
of Property defines a power as general if, being exercisable before the
death of the donee, it can be exercised wholly in favor of the donee,
or, being testamentary, it can be exercised wholly in favor of his estate.85
Nevertheless, it would be unsound to hold that wherever the donee
is one of the objects the power is general because there is an indirect
freedom of disposition. The courts have not been reluctant to find
that powers to appoint to limited classes including the donees are powers in trust. In these cases the donee's freedom is hampered not merely
formally but also substantially. If a rule is prescribed by the donor for
85
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the exercise of the donee's discretion, the donee must observe that rule.
But even if the donor gives the donee an unregulated discretion, the
court may still exercise a measure of control over the donee. In exercising his unfettered discretion the donee need not give reasons for the
appointments he makes, but if he does, and they appear improper, the
court will intervene.86 Even where there is no trust, it may be possible
to restrain the donee's freedom of disposition by means of the doctrine
of fraud upon a power. This possibility exists by reason of the fact that
specific objects are designated. The court, therefore, may find that
the donor contemplated dispositions of a particular kind for the benefit
of these objects, and that the dispositions actually made by the donee
do not comply with the end designed by the donor. It is submitted that
this may be done even where the court is unable to find a trust. Nor
do the two doctrines of imperative powers and fraud upon a power
involve the same consequences. If an imperative power is not exercised, the court will itself distribute the property on the theory of a
constructive trust or implied gift. 37 If there is fraud upon a power, the
court will set aside the improper appointment as void,88 but it will not
order the distribution of the property if the power is not in trust. A
further limitation on the donee's freedom of disposition must be noted.
In some jurisdictions the doctrines of non-exclusive powers and illusory
appointments still prevail.39 Thus, if the court chooses to find that the
86
Rex v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 15 East 117, 104 Eng. Rep. 789 (1912);
Re Beloved Wilkes's Charity, 3 Mac. & G. 440, 42 Eng. Rep. 330 (1851); LEWIN,
TRUSTS, 14th ed., 347 (1939).
37
Brown v. Higgs, 4 Ves. Jun. (Ch.) 708, 31 Eng. Rep. 366 (1799), affd. on
rehearing, 5 Ves. Jun. 495, 31 Eng. Rep. 700 (1800), affd. by Lord Chancellor, 8
Ves. Jun. 561, 32 Eng. Rep. 473 (1801), affd. 18 Ves. Jun. (H. L.) 192, 34 Eng.
Rep. 290 ( I 8 I 3). For the constructive trust theory, see I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,
§§ 287-288 (1936); Simes, "Powers in Trust and the Termination of Powers by the
Donee," 37 YALE L. J. 63, 21 I (1927); Dominick v. Sayre, 3 Sandf. (N. Y. Super.)
555 (1850); Milhollen's Admr. v. Rice, 13 W. Va. 510 (1878). For the implied gift
theory, see: Gray, "Powers in Trust and Gifts Implied in Default of Appointment,"
25 HARV. L. REv. I (1911); McGaughey's Admr. v. Henry, 15 B. Mon. (54 Ky.)
383 (1854); Rogers v. Rogers, 2 Head. (39 Tenn.) 660 (1859); Moore v. Ffolliot,
L. R. Ir. 19 Ch. D. 499 (1887); Loosing v. Loosing, 85 Neb. 66, 122 N. W.
707 (1909).
88
2 CHANCE, TREATISE ON PowERs, c. XXI, § ii (1841); FARWELL, PowERs,
3d ed., 457-497 (1916); KALES, EsTATEs, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., § 612
(1920); I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 290 (1936); 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
§§ 352-354 (1940); 14 SoL. J. 832 (1870); 34 SoL. J. 598 (1890); 76 SoL. J.
506 (1932); 86 L. J. 57 (1938); 82 SoL. J. 722 (1938).
39
Melvin v. Melvin, 6 Md. 541 (1854); Portsmouth v. Shackford, 46 N. H.
423 (1866); New v. Potts, 55 Ga. 420 (1875); McCamant v. Nuckolls, 85 Va. 331,
12 S. E. 160 (1888); Thrasher v. Ballard, 35 W. Va. 524, 14 S. E. 232 (1891);
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donor intended that all the objects were to have some share of the
property, the donee must appoint to each object a share of the property which is fair, having regard to the size of the property, the number of objects, and the general circumstances of the case.40 In those
jurisdictions which retain the principle of illusory appointments, recourse need not be had to the doctrine of fraud upon a power in order
to ensure the realization of the donor's design.
It has been shown that even though, upon the interpretation of a
power, the donee is found to be an object, it does not follow by any
means that he enjoys an unrestrained freedom of disposition. There
are doctrines which the courts may employ to control the donee, and it
has been seen from some of the cases that the courts are eager to exercise this control. These considerations may be responsible for the
fact that a power is not general, according to the Restatement, unless
the donee is able to appoint wholly in his own favor. 41 Some statutes
have avoided the problem of classification by abandoning the term
"general power" for some other terminology. Some statutes speak of
powers which the donee may exercise for his own benefit,42 and it has
been seen that the English Finance Act of 1894 refers to competency
to dispose of property as the donee thinks fit. Provisions of this kind,
it seems, are based on the general idea that indirect freedom of disposition, which arises after an appointment by the donee to himself, is
equivalent, for the particular purpose envisaged by the statute, to
direct freedom of disposition.

B. A Power to Appoint to Anyone Except Certain
Named Persons
There are very few American cases dealing with the classification
of this type of power. There are four decisions which consider it in
relation to the federal estate tax. Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughn "8
Hatchett v. Hatchett, 103 Ala. 556, 16 So. 550 (1894); Herrick v. Fowler, 108
Tenn. 410, 67 S. W. 861 (1902); Barrett's Exr. v. Barrett, 166 Ky. 411, 179 S. W.
396 (1915}; In re Sloan's Estate, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 319, 46 P. (2d) 1007 (1935);
3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 361 (1940).
40
SUGDEN, PowERS, 8th ed., 938 et seq. (1861); Butcher v. Butcher, IV. & B, 79
at 102, 35 Eng. Rep. 31 (1812); Barrett's Exr. v. Barrett, 166 Ky. 4II, 179 S. W.
396 (1915) •
.u But this may refer to the fact that, according to the RESTATEMENT, a power
is not general unless it enables the donee to appoint the whole fee. See note 3, supra.
2
" E.g., English Bankruptcy Act, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 38 (1914); English
Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5., c. 20, § 195 (1925); Federal Bankruptcy Act, 52
Stat. L. 879, § I (1938), II U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 110 (a).
48
(D. C. Pa. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 987.
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does not really involve a power of this kind, but it was decided as if it
did. The decedent had a testamentary power exercisable only while she
remained unmarried. She died without having married. The court
held that as she could not appoint to any husband she might marry or
children she might have the power was not general. This decision is
obviously absurd, and has since been disapproved on several occasions/"
As long as the donee remained unmarried she had an unlimited power
of disposition. Once she married, that power did not become limited;
it ceased. What is of interest, however, is the assumption that if the
donee is unable to appoint to husband or children, the power is special,
even though the power is otherwise unlimited as to objects. Again, in
W.R. Helmholz,4 5 the Board of Tax Appeals held that a power to appoint to natural persons and charitable organizations was not general for
the purposes of the federal estate tax. In Christine Smith Kendrick,
Ex'x, 46 the decedent was the donee of powers which she could exercise
in favor of anyone except her brother Walter and his descendants. The
board decided that these powers were general only if Walter died before
the decedent and left no descendants. If he survived her, or if he predeceased her but left descendants who survived the decedent, the
powers would be special, because a general power confers on the donee
complete freedom in the choice of objects. The board was, however,
willing to assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that Walter
had died before the decedent and had left no descendants. In Leser v.
Burnet 41 property was conveyed to trustees, and the settlor directed
that his daughter should have power to appoint part of the property
to "such persons as she, by her last will ... shall have named, limited
and appointed to take and have the same." The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a general power permits the
donee to appoint to himself and his creditors, as well as to all others.
In this case the property was situated in Maryland, and the law of that
state determined the effect of the instrument creating the power. The
language would in most jurisdictions create a general power, but in
Maryland it did not permit the donee to appoint to herself or her
creditors. The power, therefore, was special for the purpose of the
estate tax.
44

J. Gilmore Fletcher, Exr., 29 B. T. A. 503 (1933); Johnstone v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 55; Christine Smith Kendrick, Ex'x, 3-4B. T. A. 1040 (1936). But it was approved in Minis v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl.
58 at 62 (1928).
5
4' 28 B. T. A. 165 (1933).
6
" 34 B. T. A. 1040 (1936).
7
" (C. C. A. 4th, 1931) 46 F. (2d) 756.

1942]

POWERS OF APPOINTMENT

35 1

Platt v. Routh ¾s is an interesting English case which was elaborately argued before all the courts on its way up to the House of
Lords. The testator, Ramsden, devised and bequeathed his residuary
estate to trustees in trust for his daughter Judith for life, with remainder to such persons, other than three named individuals and their
relatives, as she should by will appoint, with remainder over in default
of appointment. He also provided that if she married or received
visits from, or resided with, or visited one of the named persons or
his relatives, she was to forfeit her power and all gifts under the will.
By her will, Judith appointed her father's residuary estate to various
persons. Questions arose in connection with the payment of legacy and
probate duties under the wills of Ramsden and his daughter.
Section 2 of the Legacy Duty Act 49 imposes various duties on
legacies given out of the personal estate and on the residue of the personal estate of a testator. Section 7 provides that any testamentary
gift out of any personal estate which the testator has power "to dispose
of as he or she shall think fit" shall be deemed to be a legacy within
the meaning and intent of the act. Section r 8 regulates the manner of
charging legacy duty where there is a power of appointment. That
section speaks of two kinds of powers: powers to appoint "to or for the
benefit of any person or persons specially named or described as objects
of such power" and "general and absolute" powers. Legacy duty in
the case of powers of the first type is imposed on the theory that the
appointees derive their interests from the donor, and in the case of
powers of the second type on the theory that the appointees derive
their interests from the donee.
Before the Court of Exchequer, the Solicitor-General argued that
the power conferred on Judith was very di:fferent from one to appoint
to particular persons. If that were not so, section 7 could be made a
dead letter. Nothing could be easier than the exclusion of some such
person as the Commissioner of Stamps, in whose favor the donee would
in no event contemplate an appointment.
"· .• To prevent the parties from having the power to dispose of
the property as they think fit, within the meaning of the act,
there must be not only an exception and exclusion, but also some
control and direction." 50
48
6 M. & W. Exch. 756, 151 Eng. Rep. 618 (1840); 3 Beav. (Ch.) 257,
-4-9 Eng. Rep. 100 (1841), affd. sub. nom. Drake v. Attorney General, IO Cl. & F.
(H. L.) 257, 8 Eng. Rep. 739 (1843).
49
36 Geo. 3, c. 52 (1756).
50
6 M. & W. 756 at 771,151 Eng. Rep. 618 (1840).
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As to section I 8, he argued that
"· .. The words 'general power' are there used in the sense of
and as applicable to a party not being restrained as to the persons
to whom they shall give the property; where they are not compelled to give it to certain specified persons, and only restrained
as to a few persons or classes of persons." 51
The appointees, who were contesting this view, relied upon the definition of a general power as one which a party may exercise "in favour
of any person he pleases, and by the exercise of which he may give to
himself, in his own lifetime, absolute property." 52 The donees were
thus arguing that the power was special, not only because certain
persons were ~xcluded from the possible appointees, but also because
the power was testamentary and did not permit an appointment by the
donee to herself. Hence it was impossible to hold that Judith had
"the entire and absolute control over this estate, or that she could
do any thing more than appoint to the exclusion of the persons
named." 53 The appointees reinforced their argument by asserting that
the excluded families consisted of persons who were the most likely
to be the objects of Judith's bounty.
" ... as the question is whether this is an absolute power or not, it
is not immaterial to show that the persons named in the case, stand
in a relationship that would make them the objects of Mrs.
[Judith] Platt's kindness, and that she was prohibited from giving
the property to them. There are restraints imposed upon her, and
yet it is contended that she is bound to pay the same duty as she
would have done if there had been no restraint upon her. The
question is, whether, in a case like this, where there are restraints
that are real and not illusory, there would, as it is insisted on the
other side, be a trust for creditors if the testatrix had any." 54
Lord Abinger, C.B., delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, pointed out that the question of the incidence of legacy duty
depended on the interpretation of section I 8. That section referred
to only two kinds of powers, but this classification was intended to
comprehend all powers. The power conferred on Judith did not literally come within either description. It followed that some violence
Id.
Id.
5s Id.
54
Id.
51

s2
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784.
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must be done to the language of the section. There was less difficulty
in treating the power as general and absolute than as a power to appoint
for the benefit of persons specially named. The power might have been
exercised by the donee wholly for her own benefit. She could have
contracted debts in her lifetime and then by her will have directed that
the fund be applied in payment of them. In fact, if she exercised the
power, the rights of the appointees would have been subordinate to
those of her creditors,
"· .. for the rule of equity, which subjects a fund so appointed to
the debts of the appointor, does not appear to be affected by the
circumstance, that there are certain persons to whom the fund
could not have been given. The question in such cases is, not
whether there are persons to whom the fund could not have been
given, but whether the party executing the power might have
executed it for his own benefit, i.e., in payment of his own
debts.•.." 115
Inasmuch as the donee could have exercised the power for her own
benefit, and as it was impossible without manifest absurdity to treat
the possible appointees as persons specially named or described, the
Court of Exchequer held that the power was general and absolute
within section 18, and that legacy duty was payable under section 7,
since the donee had power to appoint as she thought fit.
The parties were dissatisfied with the findings of the Exchequer
and presented a petition to the Rolls Court. Substantially the same
arguments were relied upon by the parties, and Lord Langdale, M.R.,
"after some hesitation, and contrary to (his] first impression," 56 affirmed the decision of the court below. The case was then taken to the
House of Lords, which refused, however, to reverse the decision of
the lower courts. The problem of legacy duty was not extensively
discussed, but it is interesting to note that the Lord Chancellor, in the
course of argument and in reply to the contention that the power was
limited, objected that the donee could exercise the power for her own
advantage by contracting debts and then appointing to creditors.
It will be obvious from this statement of the case that no general
conclusion was reached on the nature of the power involved. The
decision is based upon an interpretation of the implied scope of the
Legacy Duty Act. The courts assumed that section I 8 was meant to
embrace all powers, and since the power in question could not be said
1111
116

Id. 789.
3 Beav. 257 at 280, 49 Eng. Rep. 100 {1841).
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to be for the benefit of persons specially named, it had necessarily to
be general and absolute within the meaning of the act. But certain
aspects of the case are of wider interest. Thus, Lord Abinger stressed
the fact that the donee was able to appoint for her own benefit, and
he seems to imply, without categorically asserting it, that this is the
characteristic feature of a general power. He treats as important the
fact that the appointed property would have to be made available for
the payment of the donee's creditors, a point strongly urged by counsel for the Crown, who also assumed in argument that the power would
be general for the purposes of the rule against perpetuities. These
views appear to be based on the fact that the donee could have appointed to her creditors. The difficulty with this theory, however, is
that the excluded persons may be creditors of the donee. This fact
may have induced the donor to exclude them from the possible objects.
A converse case, although one less likely to arise, would also show the
weakness of Abinger's theory. The donor may have conferred a power
exercisable in favor of named objects, some or all of whom are creditors
of the donee. If the donee exercises the power in favor of some of the
objects, could it be argued that because he could have appointed to all
of them the property must go in satisfaction of the claims of all?
In Edie v. Babington 51 the Irish Master of the Rolls was required
to decide whether property subject to a testamentary power to appoint
to anyone other than a single named person was an asset for the payment of the donee's creditors where the donee exercised the power and
his own property was insufficient to satisfy his debts. Much of the argument in the case was addressed to the question whether the fact that
the power was testamentary only prevented recourse to the property in
favor of the donee's creditors. It was decided that the property could
be devoted to the payment of the donee's debts. It was, however, also
argued that the power was not general because of the exclusion of the
named person. The Master of the Rolls did not discuss this point, but
purported to agree with the observations of Lords Langdale and
Abinger in Platt v. Routh, which, in his opinion, were "a complete
answer to the objection which has been raised." 58 He did not state
which were the observations he relied upon, and it would indeed be
difficult to find any which gave unequivocal support to his decision.
There are two other English cases which deal with the classification
of powers to appoint to all except a specified person or persons. Both
involve the application of section 27 of the Wills Act. By that section
1
~

3 Ir. Ch. 568 (1854).

88

Id. 576.
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a general devise or bequest or any general description of the testator's
real or personal property, in the absence of any contrary intention
appearing in the will, shall operate as the execution of any general
power of which the testator may be the donee. In Re Byron's Settlement 50 there was a settlement by which freeholds vested in A were
conveyed by her to trustees upon trust to permit her daughter M to
receive the rents for her sole and separate use, and upon further trust
for such person or persons, not being her present husband or any friend
or relative of his, for such estate or estates as M should by deed or
other instrument in writing or by will appoint. M made a will which
contained a general devise and bequest of all her real and personal
property. There was real estate other than that which had been settled
by A. There was no specific exercise of the power. It was argued for
those taking on default of appointment that the power was not general
because the donee had no power "to appoint in any manner she may
think proper" within the meaning of section 27. Platt v. Routh, it was
protested, was a decision on the interpretation of the Legacy Duty Act.
It had been necessary to do some violence to the wording of that act,
but no such necessity existed in the case of the Wills Act. For those taking under the will, it was argued that Platt v. Routh and Edie v.
Babington had established that the power was general. "Friend" and
"relative," they further insisted, were too vague and must be struck
out, and since the husband was dead at the date when the will took
effect, all the exclusions were inoperative. The power, therefore, was
perfectly general at tlie only date which was decisive.
Kekewich, J ., thought that the purpose of section 27, although not
altering the distinction between power and property, was to recognize
that a general power is in substance so similar to property that injustice
may be done by insisting on the technical distinction. A man who has
a general power of appointment has the power of disposition which he
would possess if he had ownership. But anything less than a power "to
appoint in any manner he may think proper"-the phrase employed by
section 2 7-is not equivalent to ownership, and a power to appoint
freely except to certain named persons is less than ownership.
" .. , A man is not any more the proprietor of land or money if he
had power to appoint to all the world except to the children of
A, than he is if he has power to appoint to the children of B. It is,
in either case, a power of selection, not ownership; the appointor
cannot deal with the property as he pleases." 60
eo Id. 479.
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Platt v. Routh and Edie v. Babington deal with aspects of powers not
involved in this case. He refused to decide whether the exclusion of
friends and relatives of the donee's husband was too vague until the
question arose in connection with an appointment to a particular person.
His refusal to consider this question is remarkable, inasmuch as he was
disposed to accept the argument that a power originally limited by
reason of exceptions might become general by the death of the excepted
persons before the exercise of the power. As the husband was dead, the
power would have been general if the exclusion of his friends and
relatives was too vague.
In Re Wilkinson 61 the question of the effect of the death of an
excluded person before the exercise of the power actually arose for
decision. The testator provided that his wife should have absolute
power to dispose by will of a stated amount of the income of his estate,
but she was to be able to appoint this income to his son James only if
James did not call in question the provisions of his father's will or institute any litigation relative thereto. James died in his mother's lifetime. Parker, J ., held that in the circumstances the donee had a power
to appoint as she thought fit within the meaning of section 27 of the
Wills Act.
From the above cases it will be seen that no general inference can
be drawn as to the nature of a power to appoint freely except in favor
of named individuals. Such a power has been held general for the
purposes of the English Legacy Duty Act and for the payment of the
donee's creditors. But it has been held special for the purposes of the
federal estate tax and for section 2 7 of the English Wills Act. To hold
that the power is special for taxation purposes, as the Board of Tax
Appeals and a circuit court of appeals have done, is a boon for taxevaders. By the exclusion from the objects of a single name chosen at
random from the telephone directory, a power which really gives the
donee complete freedom of selection is converted into a special power,
so as to take the property subject to it out of the ambit of the estate
tax. On the other hand, it is almost impossible to formulate a test by
which to decide whether the exclusion is bona fide or merely for the
purpose of evading the tax. One cannot, as a rule, tell what hidden
grudges the donor nursed against the excluded person or institution.
Nor does it simplify matters to suggest that the test should be whether
the exclusion will in fact operate to limit the donee's discretion. A
testator's relatives and friends are often shocked by the nature of his
61

[

1910] 2 Ch. 216.
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benefactions. A workable solution might be the adoption of a rule that
the power remains general if the exclusion is not bona fide or does not
in fact hamper the donee's discretion, coupled with the further rule that
in cases of doubt the benefit of that doubt should be given to the government.
At least one matter appears to be reasonably clear with respect to
these powers. If the excluded persons die before the exercise of the
power, the power becomes general for all purposes. In Christine Smith
Kendrick, Ex'x, the Board of Tax Appeals was willing to assume, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, that the excluded person had predeceased the exercise of the power. It seems, however, that English
courts require those who rely upon the death of excluded persons to
prove that fact.

C. A Power to Appoint to Anyone Except the Donee
In Re Park 62 the testator devised and bequeathed his residuary
estate to trustees on trust to pay the income of the balance after certain
dispositions to such person, other than herself, or persons, or charitable
institution or institutions, as the donee should from time to time during
her lifetime in writing direct. The trustees took out a summons to
discover whether this power was valid. It was argued that it was invalid since it was neither a general nor a special power. It was not general, because the donee could not appoint to herself, and it was not
special, because the objects were not designated. The purported power,
it was claimed, was merely an attempt by the testator to delegate to
another the making of his will, and, as such, it was invalid. Clauson, J .,
rejected this argument, holding that the division of valid powers into
general and special is not exhaustive. Platt v. Routh and Re Byron's
Settlement establish the validity of powers to appoint to anyone except
named persons, and there is no reason why the excluded person cannot
be the donee.
There was no question in this case of the incidents to be attached
to the power. A common example of the power here considered, for
which the incidents have been worked out, is the power to appoint
generally but exercisable by will only. In effect, this is a power to
appoint to anyone except the donee. Notwithstanding this, it has been
held that such a power is exercised by a general bequest or devise, in
the absence of a contrary intention appearing in the will. 63 It is general
62

[1932] 1 Ch. 580.
Hawthorn v. Shedden, 3 Sm. & G. 293, 65 Eng. Rep. 665 (1856); Re
Powell's Trusts, 39 L. J. (Ch.) 188 (1869); Re Jones, 34 Ch. D. 65 (1886); Re
Wilkinson, [ 1910] 2 Ch. 216.
68
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for the federal estate tax.6 4, If the power is exercised, the appointed
property may be made available for the satisfaction of the donee's debts
where his own property is inadequate for the purpose.65 The power
may be exercised by conferring on the appointee another power.66 If
the appointment lapses, the property appointed may go under the
donee's will or as on his intestacy. 67 These are all characteristics of
general powers. There has, however, been a difference of opinion in
connection with the rule against perpetuities. In the United States
an unlimited testamentary power is not treated as a general power for
the purposes of the rule against perpetuities. 68 The reason usually
given is that the donee does not enjoy complete freedom of disposition,
inasmuch as he cannot appoint to himself. In England this question is
not yet conclusively settled, but the little authority which does exist
inclines in favor of treating the power as general.69
Alth_ough a testamentary power is, in effect, a power to appoint
6
4,Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn, (D. C. Pa. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 591 at 592, a.ffd.
(C. C. A. 3d, 1927) 21 F. (2d) 164; Emily Annette Agnus Leser, Ex'x, 17 B. T. A.
266 (1929); Edward J. Haney, Exr., 17 B. T. A. 464 (1929); Mary M. Lee, Ex'x,
18 B. T. A. 251 (1929); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, (C. C. A.
3d, 1929) 34 F. (2d) 600 at 603; Blackburne v. Brown, (D. C. Pa. 1929) 35 F.
(2d) 963; Cortlandt F. Bishop, Exr., 23 B. T. A. 920 (1931); Lee v. Commissioner,
(App. D. C. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 399, cert. den. Lee v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 563, 52 S.
Ct. 645 (1932); J. Earl Morgan, Exr., 36 B. T. A. 588 (1937). See also Webb v.
McCracken, 3 Comm. L. R. (Aust. High Ct.) 1018 (1906).
65
Thompson v. Towne, 2 Vern. 319, 23 Eng. Rep. 806 (1694); Jenney v.
Andrews, 6 Madd. 264, 56 Eng. Rep. 1091 (1822); Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N. H.
298 (1844); Williams v. Lomas, 16 Beav. 1, 51 Eng. Rep. 675 (1852);
Re Davies' Trusts, L. R. 13 Eq. 163 (1871); Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200
(1879); Re Guedalla, [1905] 2 Ch. 331; Re Hadley, [1909] 1 Ch. 20; Re
Benzon, [1914] 2 Ch. 68. Contra: St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette, 259 Ky. 802,
83 S. W. (2d) 471 (1935).
66
White v. Wilson, 1 Drew. 298, 61 Eng. Rep. 466 (1852); Frear v. Pugsley,
9 Misc. 316, 30 N. Y. S. 149 (1894); Mays v. Beech, II4 Tenn. 544, 86 S. W.
713 (1905); Cheever v. Cheever, 172 App. Div. 353, 157 N. Y. S. 428 (1916);
Lehman v. Spicer, 108 Misc. 721, 176 N. Y. S. 445 (1919), a.ffd. 188 App. Div.
931, 176 N. Y. S. 445 (1919); Bucknell's Estate, 29 Pa. D. 631 (1920). Contra:
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Prindle, 290 Mass. 577, 195 N. E. 793 (1935)
(semble); De Charette v. De Charette, 264 Ky. 525, 94 S. W. (2d) 1018 (1936).
See 50 HARV. L. REv. 938 (1937).
67 Re Hadley, [1909] 1 Ch. 20 at 35, per Farwell, L. J.
68 Smith's Appeal, 88 Pa. 492 (1879); Genet v. Hunt, II3 N. Y. 158, 21
N. E. 91 (1889); Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 57 A. 609, 58 A. 36 (1904);
Minot v. Paine, 230 Mass. 514, 120 N. E. 167 (1918); Northern Trust Co. v.
Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N. E. (2d) 487 (1938).
69 Rous v. Jackson, 29 Ch. D. 521 (1885); Re Flower, 55 L. J. (Ch.) 200
(1885); Stuart v. Babington, L. R. Ir. 27 Ch. D. 551 (1891). Contra: Re Powell's
Trusts, 39 L. J. (Ch.) 188 ( 1869).
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to anybody except the donee himself, it does not necessarily follow
that the incidents of such a power will attach to a power to appoint
to anybody except the donee but exercisable by deed. Where the power
is testamentary only, the donee is dead when the exercise of the power
takes effect, so that for most purposes his non-existence at that date is
as irrelevant for the question of the nature of the power as the predecease of any other person. By means of his will the donee has complete freedom of disposition at the date when the power becomes exercisable. But if the power is exercisable by deed, the donee is still in
existence at the date of exercise of the power. One of the characteristics
of a general power, as distinguished from a special power, is that
where an appointment lapses the appointed property may go under the
donee's will or as on his intestacy, or may result to the donee. 70 This
depends on the donee's intention in making the appointment. "The
question ... is ... whether the donee of the power meant by the exercise of it to take the property dealt with out of the instrument creating
the power for all purposes, or only for the limited purpose of giving
effect to the particular disposition expressed." 71 It could hardly be
argued that where an appointment lapses under a power to appoint by
deed to anyone except the donee, the donee intended to make the property his own for all purposes, so that it results to him. This must be
so if for no other reason than that what has been said here with respect
to lapsed appointments is equally true of invalid appointments. If the
property results to the ·donee under the power here considered, the
donee could always defeat the donor's intention by making an invalid
appointment. It would also seem that the donee does not possess that
freedom of disposition which would justify the application of the
70
Wilkinson v. Schneider, L. R. 9 Eq. 423 ( 1870) ; Harker v. Reilly, 4 Del. Ch.
72 (1872); Re Horton, 51 L. T. R. 420 (1884); Re Scott, [1891] 1 Ch. 298;
Lyndall's Estate, 2 Pa. D. & C. 476, 32 W. N. C. 325 (1893); Re Marten, [1902]
I Ch. 314; Re Pryce, [19n] 2 Ch. 286; Dunbar v. Hammond, 234 Mass. 554, 125
N. E. 686 (1920); Bradford v. Andrew, 308 Ill. 458, 139 N. E. 922 (1923); Bundy
v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N. E. 337 (1926); Re Vander Byl,
[1931] 1 Ch. 216; Talbot v. Riggs, 287 Mass. 144, 191 N. E. 360 (1934);
Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N. E. (2d) 487 (1938); 3 PROPERTY
RESTATEMENT, § 365 (1940); 2 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 426 (1935); 82 SoL. J.
227 (1938).
71 Chatterton, V. C., in Re De Lusi's Trusts, L. R. Ir. 3 Ch. D. 232 at 237
(1879). See also: Re Pinede's Settlement, 12 Ch. D. 667 at 672 (1879); WilloughbyOsborne v. Holyoake, 22 Ch. D. 238 at 239 (1882); Coxen v. Rowland, [1894]
I Ch. 406. The principle applies to both realty and personalty: Re Van Hagan, 16
Ch. D. 18 (1880); 16 SoL. J. 262 (1872); 159 L. T. 257 (1925); 19 MINN. L.
REV. 127 (1934).
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rule against perpetuities as if the power were general. No question
could arise here of an indirect freedom of disposition such as exists in
the case of a power to appoint to a limited class which includes the
donee. On the other hand, it is true that the donee can appoint to
creditors, and it is possible that if he were insolvent the courts would
apply the appointed property in satisfaction of his debts. 72
If the power is exercisable by deed or will, the position is no less
complicated. Would the power be exercised by a general devise or
bequest? The purpose of statutes which declare that a general devise or
bequest shall operate to exercise a general power is to remove the difference between power and property which a layman would not perceive. It is established that powers exercisable by will only fall within
the scope of these statutes, 78 but in the case of such powers the donee at
the date when the exercise of the power takes e:ffect has the maximum
freedom of disposition which he can enjoy in the circumstances. A layman
is less likely to consider that he enjoys property rather than a power
where the power, though exercisable ·by will, is also exercisable by deed
but not in his own favor. No problem would arise, however, if the
power were construed as incorporating two, one exercisable by deed
and a distinct one exercisable by will.

II
THE SOLUTION

A number of powers exist which do not comply with the traditional
definitions of general and special powers. The treatment of some of
these powers by American and English courts has been considered
above. These, however, are not the only powers which are difficult to
classify. What shall be said of a power to appoint property to those
persons to whom the donee shall dispose of his own property? This
may be considered a general power to appoint freely or a special power
for the benefit of designated objects. In one English case,74 a power
of this kind was held to be a general power. Again, the courts have
been troubled by powers, unlimited as to the choice of objects, but
72 The general question whether property appointed by deed is assets for the
payment of the donee's creditors in an administration action is unsettled. As for bankruptcy, see English Bankruptcy Act, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 38 (1914), and decisions
thereon: Nichols to Nixey, 29 Ch. D. 1005 (1885); Re Rose, [1904] 2 Ch. 348,
[1905] 1 Ch. 94; Re Benzon, [1914] 2 Ch. 68; Re Mathieson, [1927] l Ch. 283;
48 SoL. J. 760 (1904).
78
See note 63, supra.
74
Bristow v. Skirrow (No. 1), 27 Beav. 585, 54 Eng. Rep. 232 (1859).
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exercisable only with the consent of some third person to the donee's
selection of appointees. 75 The idiosyncracies of donors and the ingenuity
of conveyancers will probably produce other "anomalous" powers of
appointment in the future.

A. Possible Treatments of Anomalous PowersNew Principles
In dealing with these "anomalous" powers there is a choice of
several courses of action:
( r) It is possible to hold that only those powers are valid which
comply with the generally accepted definitions of general or special
powers. This approach was rejected in Re Park. There is no reason
why these definitions should be allowed to hamper the development
of such new powers as settlors deem it useful to employ in order to
e:ffect their purposes.
(2) It is possible to abandon the old definitions and seek for new
criteria by which to achieve an automatic classification of all powers.
There have been a number of attempts to discover such criteria. The
following have been suggested:
(a) A general power allows complete freedom of action. Any
limitation on this freedom, no matter how unimportant or trivial,
makes the power special.76 This, however, would be a direct invitation
to tax-evasion and the defeat of creditors. By the exclusion of a single
individual, who would not be an object of the donee's bounty even in
his wildest extravagance, the power would have to be treated as special.
This would mean that the donee's creditors would have no rights
against the appointed property, and that the property would be taken
out of the federal estate tax, even though the donee's freedom of action
is in substance unimpaired. Moreover, in the case of those powers
where the donee is able to appoint to himself, the donee has an indirect
freedom of disposition by means of an appointment to himself first.
75
Eland v. Baker, 29 Beav., 137, 54 Eng. Rep. 579 (1867); Webb v. Sadler,
L. R. 8 Ch. 419 (1873); Charlton v. Attorney General, 4 App. Cas. 427 (1879);
Goatley v. Jones, [1909] 1 Ch. 557; Re Dilke, [1921] 1 Ch. 34; Re Phillips,
[1931] 1 Ch. 347; Re Watts, [1931) 2 Ch. 302; Re Joicey, 76 SoL. J. 459
(1932); Charles J. Hepburn, Exr., 37 B. T. A. 459 (1938); Morgan v. Commissioner,
309 U.S. 78, 60 S. Ct. 424 (1940).
76
Lord Townshend v. Windham, 2 Ves. Sen. 1 at 9-10, 28 Eng. Rep. 1 (1750),
per Lord Hardwicke (semble); Re Byron's Settlement, (1891] 3 Ch. 474, per Kekewich, ].; Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn, (D. C. Pa. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 591, affd.
(C. C. A. 3d, 1927) 21 F. (2d) 164.
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(b) A general power is one which permits the donee to appoint
to himself. 77
( c) A general power is one which permits the donee to appoint to
his own estate or to his creditors. 78 This test differs from (b) in that
it clearly includes unlimited testamentary powers.
(d) The United States Treasury Regulations and the Property
Restatement combine (b) and (c). The 1937 edition of the regulations 79 states that
"· .. Ordinarily a general power is one to appoint to any person
or persons in the discretion of the donee of the power, or however
limited as to the persons or objects in whose favor the appointment may be made, is exercisable in favor of the donee, his estate,
or his creditors."
With this it is interesting to compare the earliest regulation 80 on the
matter:
". . . A general power is one to appoint to any person or persons
in the discretion of the donee. Where the donee is required to
appoint to a specified person or class of persons, the property
should not be included in his gross estate."
The Restatement 81 defines a general power as one which can be
exercised wholly in favor of the donee if it is exercisable before his
death, or wholly in favor of his estate if it is testamentary. A power is
special if it can be exercised only in favor of certain persons, not including the donee, who constitute a group not unreasonably large, and
the donor has not manifested an intention to create the power primarily
for the benefit of the donee. The comment makes it clear that these are
approximate tests only, and not inflexible canons, because they will not
cover all possible powers. Thus, they do not apply to a power to appoint to anybody except the donee, or ~o a power to appoint to a group
including the donee where the donor has manifested an intention that
the donee is not to have all the property.
77
Farmers' Loan'& Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N. Y. 266 at 276, 85 N. E. 59
(1908); Gray, "Release and Discharge of Powers," 24 HARv. L. REv. 511 (1911);
SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 246 (1936).
78
Platt v. Routh, 6 M. & W. (Exch.) 756, 151 Eng. Rep. 618 (1840), per Lord
Abinger, a.ffd. sub nom. Drake v. Attorney General, IO CI. & F. (H. L.) 270, 8 Eng.
Rep. 739 (1843), per Lord Chancellor in the course of argument; Leser v. Burnet,
(C. C. A. 4th, 1931) 46 F. (2d) 756.
79
TREAS. REG. 80, art. 24 (1937). See also Morgan v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 309 U. S. 78, 60 S. Ct. 424 (1940).
80
TREAs. REG. 37, art. 30 (1919).
81
3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 320 (1940).
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Some statutes dealing with powers appear to favor a somewhat
similar test of a general power when they speak of powers which a
donee may exercise for his own benefit.82
The weakness of (b), (c), and (d) can best be appreciated, as has
already been pointed out, by applying them to powers to appoint to a
limited class which includes the donee. It has been seen that the courts
are eager to control the donee even where the donor intended that the
donee should be empowered to appoint to himself. The Restatement
takes cognizance of this difficulty. One may question the wisdom of
holding that a power to appoint to anyone but the donee is special for
all purposes.
( e) If the limitation on the donee's freedom of disposition is apparent rather than real, the power is general.83 This would involve
an inquiry into what the donee would have done had there been no
limitation imposed. In the vast majority of cases it would be impossible
to settle this question.
( f) If the donor of the power indicates that the appointees are
to derive title from him and not from the donee, the power is special.8 ¼
It is true that in many problems connected with powers the donor's
intention is decisive, but such a test when applied to the classification
of powers would be paying undue deference to his wishes. It would
permit him to reduce all powers whose classification is uncertain to the
single category of special powers wherever that would be for the benefit
of his estate or the appointees.
(g) It is sometimes said that a power is special if it is for the benefit of persons specially named.85 One of the persons specially named,
however, may be the donee himself, and the effect of this may be that
the donee has all the freedom of disposition which he would enjoy
under a general power, provided only he employs the formality of an
appointment to himself first.
(3) In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the above tests and
E.g., English Bankruptcy Act, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 38 (1914); English
Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 195 (1925); Federal Bankruptcy Act, 52
Stat. L. 879, § I (1938), I I U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § IOl(a).
83 Argument in Platt v. Routh, 6 M. & W. 756 at 771, 151 Eng. Rep. •618
(1840).
8
¼Solicitor-General in Plattv. Routh, 6 M. & W. 756 at 771, 151 Eng. Rep. 618
(1840); Re Dunbar-Buller, [1923] 2 I. R. 143 at 150, per Andrews, L. J.
85 Solicitor-General, arguendo, in Platt v. Routh, 6 M. &W. (Exch.) 756 at 771,
151 Eng. Rep. 618 (1840), affd. sub. nom. Drake v. Attorney General, IO Cl. & F.
(H. L.) 288, 8 Eng. Rep. 739 (1843), per L. C. See also Legacy Duty Act, 36 Geo.
3, c. 52, § 18 (1796); and Lee v. Commissioner, (App. D. C. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 399.
82
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of the definitions hitherto accepted, the courts may adopt a third alternative. This would involve the conclusion that general tests are
neither feasible nor necessary. The courts may recognize that the usual
definitions are no more than rough descriptions of the most common
powers, and are in no sense absolute. Historically this view is perfectly
justifiable, for, as Holdsworth points out,86 the definitions were not
adopted at one stroke, but were developed with reference to the interests of creditors, the rule against perpetuities, and delegability. When
a new power comes before the courts, it should not be tested by any
rigid formula, but should be examined in relation to the purpose for
which it is to be classified. In applying a particular rule of law to an
"anomalous" power, the court should determine the policy of that rule
and be guided by it in dealing with the power. This may result in
classifying the same power as general for one purpose and special for
another, but it is submitted that this is the only sound technique which
can be adopted in the classification of powers.
,
It cannot be pretended that the courts have always employed the
approach here advocated. Cases have been decided by an uncritical
deference to other decisions which appear to involve a similar problem
but in fact do not because of the different purpose for which the power
was being classified. Re Dunbar-Buller,87 an Irish case, is a particularly
good example of this thoughtless application of so-called precedents.
It has been decided that the words "power to appoint in any manner
he may think proper" in section 2 7 of the English Wills Act exclude
from the scope of that section a power which the donor prescribes shall
be exercised only by a will expressly referring to the power.88 Decisions so holding are based upon no more than an interpretation of the
section. The words quoted apply not to the choice of objects but to the
mode of appointment. 89 Although section 27 refers to general powers,
it has been recognized that powers which do not come within the section because of its interpretation may yet be general for other purposes.
In Re Dunbar-Buller the Irish Court of Appeal was faced with the
problem of applying certain provisions of the Finance Acts of 1894,00
1900,91 and 1907,02 relating to estate duty, to a power, unlimited as to
86

7 HoLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 2d ed., 170 (1937).
[1923] 2 I. R. 143.
88
Phillips v. Cayley, 43 Ch. D. 222 (1889); Re Tarrant's Trusts, 58 L.
(Ch.) 780 (1889); Re Davies, [1892] 3 Ch. 63; Re Lane, [1908] 2 Ch. 581.
89
Phillips v. Cayley, 43 Ch. D. 222 (1889).
90
57 & 58 Viet., e. 30 (1894).
91
63 & 64 Viet., e. 7 (1900).
92
7 Edw. 7, e. 13 (1907).
87

J.
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objects, to appoint by a will expressly referring to the power. The
policy of these provisions appears to be that a decedent who enjoys an
unrestricted freedom of disposition under a power of appointment
shall be deemed to be the owner of the property for the purpose of
imposing the estate duty. The court decided to follow the decisions
on section 27 of the Wills Act, on the assumption that they established
a general test for the classification of powers, and held, therefore, that
the power in question was not general for estate duty.
Platt v. Routh,9 3 in contrast to Re Dunbar-Buller, illustrates the
approach here advocated. The courts in that case classified the power
in the light of the policy of the statute there involved. It is also interesting to note that Lord Abinger, in discussing the rights of the donee's
creditors, did not say that because the power was general the creditors
could have recourse to the appointed property, but that, inasmuch as
the donee could have appointed to her creditors, the power must be
considered general in so far as their rights were concerned. 94 Re Byron's
Settlement,95 whatever one thinks of the actual decision, also proceeds
upon an analysis of the purpose of the rule of law involved. This is
clearly true of Re Penrose 96 also.

B. Applications of the Suggested Solution
It remains to consider the classification of the powers dealt with
above for some of the more important purposes for which powers must
be classified in the light of the test which has been suggested.
I.

Problems of Liability for Debts of Donee

A general power has been so far assimilated to property that on its
exercise the appointed property is in most jurisdictions considered the
assets of the donee for distribution to his creditors where his own property proves to be insufficient for the payment of his debts. 97 Property
subject to a special power is never made available for the donee's
creditors.
98

6 M. & W. 756, 151 Eng. Rep. 618 (1840), discussed supra at note 48.
6 M. & W. at 789.
95
[ l 891] 3 Ch. 4 74, discussed supra at note 59.
96
[1933] Ch. 793, discussed supra at note 30 et seq.
97
Ashfield v. Ashfield, 2 Vern. 287, 23 Eng. Rep. 785 (1693); Thompson v.
Towne, 2 Vern. 319, 23 Eng. Rep. 806 (1694); Lassells v. Cornwallis, 2 Vern. 465,
23 Eng. Rep. 898 (1704); Hinton v. Toye, I Atk. 465, 26 Eng. Rep. 296 (1739);
Pack v. Bathurst, 3 Atk. 269, 26 Eng. Rep. 957 (1745); Lord Townshend v.
Windham, 2 Ves. Sen. 1, 28 Eng. Rep. l (1750); George v. Milbanke, 9 Ves. 190, 32
Eng. Rep. 575 (1803); Williams v. Lomas, 16 Beav. 1, 51 Eng. Rep. 675 (1852);
Fleming v. Buchanan, 3 De G. M. & G. 976, 43 Eng. Rep. 382 (1853); Re Lawley,
94
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There have been many attempts to explain this treatment of general powers:
(a) It has been said that the appointee becomes a trustee for the
donee's creditors. 98 But the donee's executor takes the property and
pays the creditors, the appointee receiving any residue remaining after
payment of the creditors.99
(b) A general power confers all the attributes of ownership, and
the donee by exercising it accepts them.100 A general power is not, however, equivalent to ownership.. The differences are many.101
[1902] 2 Ch. 673, 799, affd. sub nom. Beyfus v. Lawley, [1903] A. C. 411;
O'Gradyv. Wilmot, [1916] 2A. C. 231.
Harrison v. Battle, I Dev. & B. Eq. (21 N. C.) 213 (1835); Johnson v.
Cushing, 15 N. H. 298 (1844); Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879); Gilman
v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144 (1881); Freeman's Admr. v. Butters, 94 Va. 406, 26 S. E. 845
(1897); Arnold v. Southern Pine Lumber Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 186, 123 S. W.
1162 (1909); Security Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Ward, IO Del. Ch. 408, 93
A. 385 (1915); Crane v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 99 N. J. Eq. 164, 133 A.
205 (1926).
Contra: Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. St. 277 (1849); Balls v. Dampman,
69 Md. 390, 16 A. 16 (1888); Wales' Admr. v. Bowdish's Exr., 61 Vt. 23, 17 A.
1000 (1888); Adger v. Kirk, 116 S. C. 298, 108 S. E. 97 (1920); Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony, 49 R. I. 339, 142 A. 531 (1928).
88
Jenney v. Andrews, 6 Madd. 264, 56 Eng. Rep. 1091 (1822), per Leach,
V. C.; Williams v. Lomas, 16 Beav. I at 3, 51 Eng. Rep. 675 (1852), per Sir J.
Romilly.
99
Re Hoskin's Trusts, 5 Ch. D. 229 (1877); Re Peacock's Settlement, [1902]
I Ch. 552.
100
Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N. H. 298 at 307-308 (1844); Price v. Cherbonnier,
103 Md. 107 at 109, 63 A. 209 (1906); O'Grady v. Wilmot, [1916] 2 A. C. 231 at
271, per Lord Sumner.
101
See for some significant differences: (1) Ray v. Pung, 5 Madd. 310, 56 Eng.
Rep. 914, 5 B. & Aid. 561, 106 Eng. Rep. 1296 (1821); I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,
§ 256 (1936), and Simes, "The Devolution of Title to Appointed Property," 22
ILL. L. REv. 480 at 493 (1928). (2) Holmes v. Coghill, 7 Ves. Jun. (Ch.) 499, 32
Eng. Rep. 201 (1802), affd. by Lord Chancellor, 12 Ves. 206, 33 Eng. Rep. 79
(1806). (3) Ewart v. Ewart, II Hare 276, 68 Eng. Rep. 1278 (1853); Bower v.
Smith, L. R. I I Eq. 279 (1871). (4) Re Earl of Devon's Settled Estate, [1896]
2 Ch. 562. (5) Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 678, 24 Eng. Rep. 913, Cas. T. Talbot
252, 25 Eng. Rep. 763 (1732); Montefiore v. Browne, 7 H. L. C. 241, I I Eng.
Rep. 96 (1858); Stamper v. Venable, 117 Tenn. 557, 97 S. W. 812 (1906). (6)
Thompson v. Schenck, 16 Ind. 194 (1861); Williams v. White, (C. C. A. 8th, 1914)
218 F. 797. (7) Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves. 27, 33 Eng. Rep. 894 (1806-1807); Jones
v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225 at 230-231 (1879); Phillips v. Wood, 16 R. I. 274, 15 A.
88 (1887). (8) People's Nat. Bank, Admr., 39 B. T. A. 565 (1939). (9) Re Mathieson, [1927] 1 Ch. 283. (10) Badham v. Mee, I My. & K. 32, 39 Eng. Rep. 593
(1832). (11) Roach v. Wadham, 6 East 289, 102 Eng. Rep. 1297 (1805). (12)
Mainprice v. Pearson, 25 W.R. 768 (1872). (13) Re D'Angibau, 15 Ch. D. 228
(1879). (14) Murphy v. Deichlet, [1909] A. C. 446. (15) Re Lewal's Settlement,
[1918] 2 Ch. 391.
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( c) Any appointment may be considered an appointment by the
donee to himself first and then to the appointee.102 It may be objected
to this explanation that the rule applies to testamentary general powers,ioa
by the exercise of which the donee cannot confer the property on himself. To this objection it could be replied that the donee of a general
testamentary power can confer the property on his estate.104 There is,
however, a further objection to this reasoning. If all appointments
were construed as in favor of the donee first, he would always be entitled to the residue where the appointment lapses. In actual fact, the
persons entitled on default of appointment are not deprived of any
residue where an appointment fails merely because the rest of the
appointed property is devoted to the payment of the donee's debts.
The residue becomes part of the donee's estate only if he has shown an
intention to make it his.105 This position could be reconciled with the
explanation here discussed by asserting that an appointment must be
construed as to the donee himself first to the extent necessary to pay his
debts or to the extent that the appointment is good. The weakness of
this argument is that the donee in making the appointment does not
distinguish beween the property necessary to pay his debts or the property effectively appointed and the residue of the property.
(d) It has been said that the donee's failure to appoint to creditors
is a fraud upon them.106 There are two criticisms of this statement. First,
the property belongs to the donor and not the donee. Secondly, the
implication of this explanation is that there would be an equal fraud
where the donee did not appoint at all. It is, however, established that
creditors of the donee are entitled to satisfaction from the property subject to the power only where it is appointed.107
( e) The donee of a power of appointment, it has sometimes been
said, is a trustee for his creditors.1° 8 In the ordinary case, however, the
donor does not intend a trust for the donee's creditors. It has also been
said that the donee's executor becomes a trustee for the donee's credi102

Attorney General v. Upton, L. R. 1 Ex. 224 at 228-229 (1866). 2 CHANCE,
TREATISE ON POWERS 143 (1841).
108
See note 65, supra.
10
"' See note 26, supra.
105 See note 7 l, supra.
106
Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N. H. 298 at 314 (1844).
107
Holmes v. Coghill, 7 Ves. Jun. (Ch.) 499, 32 Eng. Rep. 201 (1802), affd.
by Lord Chancellor 12 Ves. 206, 33 Eng. Rep. 79 (1806); Duncanson v. Manson,
3 App. D. C. 260 (1894), affd. 166 U. S. 533, 17 S. Ct. 647 (1897); Supreme
Colony v. Towne, 87 Conn. 644, 89 A. 264 (1914).
108 Platt v. Routh, 6 M. & W. 756 at 772, 151 Eng. Rep. 618 (1840), per Wilde,
S. C., arguendo; O'Grady v. Wilmot, [1916] 2 A. C. 231 at 264, per Lord Atkinson.
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tors.100 But he is not appointed trustee, and the donee's intention is to
pass his creditors by.
It is obvious that there are sufficient inherent weaknesses in the
above explanations to make them unacceptable. It is clear that they
are ex post facto justifications of a rule based on considerations of
policy divorced from strict legal doctrine. The truth of the matter
is that equity intervenes arbitrarily and without regard to doctrine
because it prefers to see the creditors of the donee satisfied before
he indulges his instincts of generosity.110
"· .. It would appear to me that as near the truth as any is the
theory that equity and good conscience require that a donee of
such a power must be just before he is generous ...." m
It would seem to follow that where the donee could himself appoint
the property to his creditors, equity will intervene to stop the property in transitu 112 and award it to creditors to the extent that the donee's
own property is insufficient. Thus, a power to appoint to anyone except
the donee should be treated as general for the purpose of satisfying the
donee's creditors from the appointed property. In the case of a power
to appoint to a limited class which includes the donee, in the absence of
any restriction on the right of the donee to appoint to himself, equity
might well hold that, as the donee could make the property his own,
it must be considered a fund for his creditors in the event of an appointment by him. This would involve an extension of the rule as
hitherto applied, but one in conformity with the policy of that rule.
The power to appoint to anyone except certain named individuals
should receive similar treatment where the excluded individuals are
not creditors. This was the opinion of Lord Abinger in Platt v.
Routh 113 and the Irish Court in Edie v. Babington.114 If, however, one
or more of the excluded persons are creditors of the donee, it would
seem that the equitable rule cannot apply. But it might be argued
successfully that equity should intervene on behalf of the creditors
who have not been excluded, on the ground that there is no reason why
Re Treasure, [1900] 2 Ch. 648 at 652, perKekewich, J.
Holmes v. Coghill, 7 Ves. 499 at 507, 32 Eng. Rep. 201 (1802); Re Harvey's
Estate, 13 Ch. D. 216 at 221-222 (1879); O'Grady v. Wilmot, [1916] 2 A. C. 231
at 270-273; Hill v. Treasurer, 229 Mass. 474 at 476, II8 N. E. 891 (1917).
111 Lord Atkinson in O'Grady v. Wilmot, [1916] 2 A. C. 231 at 264.
112
Lord Hardwicke in Lord Townshend v. Windham, 2 Ves. Sen. 1, 28 Eng.
Rep. l (1750).
118
6 M. & W. 756, 151 Eng. Rep. 618 (1840), discussed supra at note 48.
114 3 Ir. Ch. 568 (1854), discussed supra at note 57.
109

110

1942]

PowERS

OF APPOINTMENT

all should be thwarted because some are not possible objects. Furthermore, relief accorded the creditors not excluded would not operate to
the detriment of the excluded creditors, since there is no preference
given to the former from property owned by the donee.
2.

Problems of Taxation

There are a number of important differences between general and
special powers in connection with death or inheritance taxes. In England these differences exist with respect to estate,115 legacy,116 and
succession 117 duties, and in the United States with respect to the federal
estate tax.118 It is not intended to give the details here of the specific
legislative provisions, but these provisions are based on a principle
which has been expressed as follows:
"The purpose of the Revenue Act is to establish a tax upon
the transmission of property and not upon the property itself.
A logical explanation of the inclusion of property passing under
general powers of appointment and the exclusion of property
passing under special powers is that where the original testator has
limited the right to appoint to certain named beneficiaries or to a
limited class of beneficiaries, it is he and not the donee of the
power who in the broadest sense transmits the property to the
beneficiaries. The donee's exercise of such narrow and limited
powers may be taken rather as a mere stage in the original scheme
of inheritance than as an independent source of descent. In such
case, it is really the death of the original testator which may reasonably be taken as the transmission of the property for the purpose of taxation. Where, however, the donee has full power to
direct the property to any beneficiary that he pleases, there is in
a real sense a transmission of it from him rather than from the
original testator." 119
115
Finance Act, 57 & 58 Viet., c. 30, §§ 2(1)(a), 22(2) (1894). See GREEN,
DEATH DUTIES 47 (1936).
116
Legacy Duty Act, 36 Geo. 3, c. 52 (1796); Stamp Act, 55 Geo. 3, c. 184,
§ 2 and Schedule (1815); Revenue Act, 8 & 9 Viet., c, 76, § 4 (1845).
117
Succession Duty Act, 16 & 17 Viet., c. SI (1853); Attorney General v. Upton,
L. R. l Ex. 224 (1866); Re Wallop's Trust, l De G. J. & Sm. 656, 46 Eng. Rep.
259 (1864).
118
Sec. 402(e) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. L. 1097 (1918), first provided that the taxable gross estate of a decedent shall include property passing under a
general power exercised by the decedent. This provision is still in force with the
addition of clause (3) introduced by section 803(b) of the 1932 Act, 47 Stat. L. 279
(1932). See Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 8II (f}.
119
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) 34 F.
(2d} 600 at 604, cert. den., 280 U. S. 602, 50 S. Ct. 85 (1929).
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The test of a special power for the purpose of taxation, according to
this statement, is whether the donor has remained the architect of the
scheme of inheritance. If he has abdicated "control and direction" 120
in favor of the donee, the power is general. It follows that if the power
enables the donee to appoint to himself, even though the donor has
designated a class of objects, the donor has not retained control over
the subsequent descent of the property. The donee has but to appoint
to himself in order to destroy any appearance of control by the donor.
Re Penrose 121 is a strong authority for this proposition.
If the power permits an appointment to anyone except certain
named individuals or to anyone except the donee himself, it cannot be
seriously argued that the donor has retained direction and control of the
course of descent. Substantially, direction and control have been invested in the donee. Platt v. Routh 122 supports this view, but the cases
on the federal estate tax already cited 123 are inconsistent with it. These
latter cases, it would seem, ignore the fundamental theory upon which
inheritance taxation as applied to powers of appointment is based, and
proceed upon a too rigid conceptualism. The decisions of the Board of
Tax Appeals here referred to are not very recent and may no longer
represent the opinion of that body. They appear, however, to receive
some support from dicta in the judgment of Justice Roberts in Morgan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.m The Supreme Court in
that case was called upon to decide whether the power of trustees to
withhold property from the objects selected by the donee of an otherwise unlimited power of appointment rendered that power of appointment special for the federal estate tax. According to Justice Roberts,
the definition of a general power which Congress had in view in framing the provision relating to estate tax in its application to powers was
one by which "t4e donee may appoint to anyone, including his own
estate or his creditors, thus having as full dominion over the property
as if he owned it." 125 It is submitted that this dictum should not be
interpreted as necessarily indicating the opinion of the Supreme Court
on powers to appoint to anybody except certain named individuals.
Such a power was not before the Court. It is interesting to note in this
connection that Justice Roberts' defip.ition of a special power does not
120

See note 50, supra.
[1891] 3 Ch. 474, discussed supra at note 59.
6 M. & W. 756, 151 Eng. Rep. 618 (1840), discussed supra at note 48.
123
See notes 43, 45, 46 and 47, supra.
m. 309 U.S. 78, 60 S. Ct. 424 (1940).
125
309 U.S. at 81.
12
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fit powers of the kind here considered. By means of a special power,
he said, "the donee may appoint only amongst a restricted or designated class of persons other than himself." 126 It cannot be argued that
there is a restricted or designated class of appointees if the donee can
appoint freely except to certain excluded persons. Elsewhere in the
judgment it is said that "The important consideration is the breadth of
the control the decedent could exercise over the property." 127 This
may, perhaps, indicate that a power may be general for the estate tax
if the donee has a sufficiently broad control, even though that control
is not formally complete. The test, it is repeated, should be, Who, in
a practical sense, can be said to be responsible for the devolution of the
property on the appointees?

3. Problems of Rule against Perpetuities
Both general and special powers must be so conferred as to become
exercisable within the period permitted by the rule against perpetuities.128 If the power is special, every possible exercise must be confined
to this period, but if the power is general, it is sufficient if its first exercise is possible within due limits.120 Again, in determining the validity
of interests created by the exercise of a: power, the perpetuity period,
where the power is special, is computed from the date when the instrument creating the power takes effect.18O Where the power is general, the period is reckoned from the date when the instrument exercising the power takes effect.181 These differences in the treatment
of the two types of powers have been explained as follows:
128

309 U.S. at 81.
309 U.S. at 83.
128
Duke of Marlborough v. Godolphin, I Eden 404, 28 Eng. Rep. 741 (1759),
affd. sub nom. Spencer v. Duke of Marlborough, 3 Bro. P. C. 232, I Eng. Rep. 1289
(1763); Wollaston v. King, L. R. 8 Eq. 165 (1869); Morgan v. Gronow, L. R.
16 Eq. l (1873); Tredennick v. Tredennick, [1900] I I. R. 354; GRAY, THE RuLE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., § 473 (1915).
129
Bray v. Hammersley, 3 Sim. 513, 57 Eng. Rep. 1090 (1830), a.ffd. sub
nom. Bray v. Bree, 8 Bli. N. S. 568, 5 Eng. Rep. 1053, 2 Cl. & F. 453, 6 Eng. Rep.
1225 (1834); 2 CoKE ON LITTLETON, INSTITUTES, 17th ed., 271b, Butler's note VII,
2 (1817); GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., § 477 (1915); LEwis,
PERPETUITY 483-484 (1843); MARSDEN, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 236
(1883); SUGDEN, PoWERs, 8th ed., 394, et seq. (1861); 71 Ir. L. T. 307 (1937).
But see Thorndike, "Remoteness of General Powers," 28 HARV. L. REv. 664 (1915).
18O
Re Legh's Settlement Trusts, [1938] Ch. 39; GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, 3d ed.,§ 525 (1915); FARWELL, PowERs, 3d ed., 325 (1916).
181
Mifilin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 205 at 213-214, 15 A. 525 (1888); Appleton's
Appeal, 136 Pa. 354, 20 A. 521 (1890); Re Earl of Devon's Settled Estates, [1896]
2 Ch. 562 at 567; FARWELL, POWERS, 3d ed., 334 (1916); GRAY, THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §§ 524, 526-526c (1915); LEWIS, PERPETUITY, c.
127
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"General powers are exempt from the restrictions of the rule
against perpetuities 132 because the existence of a general power
leaves the property in a position which for the present purpose
does not differ from that in which it would stand if there were an
absolute owner. There exists by the existence of the power a
present immediate and unrestrained alienability, and there is no
necessity to consider in such case how far a perpetuity may be
created.any more than it is necessary to consider it in the case of
of an absolute owner.
"Particular or special powers such as a power to appoint among
a named class of persons differ from general powers in that the
donee has not an unrestricted power of alienation." 133
The rationale of the special application of the rule against perpetuities
to general powers is thus the unlimited power of disposition which the
donee enjoys. Dicta that the donee of a general power is practically the
owner are common in cases dealing with this question.184 This
has been interpreted literally, particularly in the treatment of unlimited
testamentary powers in the United States. These are held not to be
general for the purposes of the rule against perpetuities. It is said that
as the donee cannot appoint to himself, it cannot be predicated of him
that he is virtually the owner of the property subject to the power.185
This conclusion is questionable since at the only date which is relevant,
the death of the donee, the donee has as unfettered a power of disposition as he has of property which he owns.
In accordance with what has been said of the theory underlying the
application of the rule against perpetuities to powers, it must be held
that powers to appoint to any one except the donee or to anyone except
certain named individuals are not general for the purposes of the rule
against perpetuities. This, however, should not apply to unlimited
testamentary powers in English law. The problem there is not yet
settled, and should be decided, it is submitted, on the ground that at the
:xx (1843); MARSDEN, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 250 (1883); IOI A. L. R.

1282 (1936); I A. L. R. 374 (1919).
182
This, of course, is not strictly true. See note I 28, supra.
188
Re Fane, [1913] I Ch. 404 at 413, per Buckley, L. J.
134
See, for example: Minot v. Paine, 230 Mass. 514, 120 N. E. 167 (1918);
Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288, 156 A. 84 (1931); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Bassett, 337 Mo. 604, 85 S. W. (2d) 569 (1935); Estate of Warren, 320 Pa.
II2, 182 A. 396 (1936); Kales, "General Powers and the Rule Against Perpeutities,"
26 HARV. L. REV. 64 (1912); Gray, "General Testamentary Powers and the Rule
against Perpetuities," 26 HARV. L. REV. 720 ( I 9 I 5).
135
See articles by Gray and Kales cited in preceeding note.
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date when the exercise of the power takes effect the donee does possess
complete freedom of disposition.
Prima facie, a power to appoint to a limited class which includes
the donee does not confer on the donee an unrestrained power of disposition. This, however, is too formalistic a view where the donee is
able to appoint wholly in his own favor. He need merely take the step
of appointing to himself in order to enjoy complete freedom of disposition. Such a power should be considered general for the purposes
of the rule against perpetuities.

4. Problems of Execution by Donee's Will
Section 2 7 of the English Wills Act and similar American statutes
have already been referred to. This section is important, not only in
itself, but also because in• combination with other sections of the Wills
Act ( and corresponding American statutes) it has resulted in a number
of rules which apply to general but not to special powers:
(a) A general power is well exercised by a will executed prior to
the date at which the instrument creating the power took effect.186 The
reason for this is that the will speaks from the death, and by section
27 property subject to a general power is comprised in the will. This
rule applies only where the donor or donee has not manifested an intention that it shall not apply.187
(b) In the absence of a contrary intention appearing, a devise or
bequest to a child of the testator-donee, who dies in the lifetime of the
136
Wills Act, 7 W. 4 & 1 Viet., c. 26, § 24 (1837); Cofield v. Pollard, 3 Jur.
N. S. 1203 (1857); Patch v. Shore, 2 Drew. & Sm. 589, 62 Eng. Rep. 743 (1862);
Boyes v. Cook, 14 Ch. D. 53 (1880); Webb v. Jones, 36 N. J. Eq. 163 (1882);
Re Old's Trusts, 54 L. T. R. 677 (1886); Airey v. Bower, 12 App. Cas. 263 (1887);
Re Hernando, 27 Ch. D. 284 (1884); Burkett v. Whittemore, 36 S. C. 428, 15
S. E. 616 (1891); In re Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances, 264 Pa. 443, 107 A. 840
(1919); 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 344 (1940); l SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, §
272 (1936). (The power must be in existence at the death of the donee-Re Young,
f 1920] 2 Ch. 427.)
Contra: Vaux's Estate, I I Phila. 57 (1875); Dunn and Biddle's Appeal, 85
Pa. 94 (1877); Howard v. Carusi, II D. C. 260 (1880), affd. 109 U. S. 260,
3 S. Ct. 575 (1883); Matteson v. Goddard, 17 R. I. 299, 21 A. 914 (1891);
Farlow v. Farlow, 83 Md. 118, 34 A. 837 (1896); Hankins v. Columbia Trust Co.,
142 Ky. 206, 134 S. W. 498 (1911). But see United States Trust Co. v. Chauncey,
32 Misc. 358, 66 N. Y. S. 563 (1900); Stone v. Forbes, 189 Mass. 163, 75 N. E.
141 (1905).
On special powers, see: Cowper v. Mantell, 22 Beav. 223, 52 Eng. Rep. 1094
(1856); Re Wells' Trusts, 42 Ch. D. 646 (1889); Doyle v. Coyle, [1895] 1 I. R.
205; Re Moses, [ l 902] l Ch. 100, affd. sub nom. Beddington v. Baumann, [ 1903]
A. C. 13; Re Bower, 141 L. T. R. 639 (1929). See also 45 SoL. J. 720 (1901).
187
Wills Act, 7 W. 4 & 1 Viet., c. 26, § 24 (1837).
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latter leaving issue, shall not lapse.188 This applies to appointments
under general powers because section 2 7 extends the meaning of
"devise" and "bequest" to include such appointments.
( c) In the absence of a contrary intention appearing in the will, a
residuary devise or bequest includes property appointed under a general
power.189
It has been seen that the purpose of section 27 is to eliminate as far
as that section is concerned, and, it would seem to follow, as far as
the sections which in combination with section 27 produce the above
rules are concerned, the di:ff erence between power and property which
a layman would not perceive.140 The power to appoint to anyone except
the donee has already been discussed. In Re Byron's Settlement 141
it was held that a power to appoint to anyone except certain named
persons is not within the scope of section 27 1 It is likely, however, that
a layman would assume that as long as he can appoint to himself he
has something equivalent to property. This is particularly so since
there would appear to be no objection to an appointment by the donee
to himself coupled with a gift of the appointed property to the excluded
person. The only objection to this reasoning is that it permits the
evasion of the donor's intention, but he should have been aware of this
possibility in permitting an appointment to the donee himself. The
objection would seem to have some force only where the donee appoints to himself and then conveys the property to the excluded person by the same instrument. If this transaction is performed by two
distinct instruments, the second executed some time after the first, it
would be difficult to argue that the conveyance to the excluded person
is void because of the evasion of the donor's direction. If the above
reasoning is correct, a power to appoint to a limited class which includes the donee, who is empowered to appoint wholly to himself, is
clearly within section 27.
188
Wills Act, 7 W. 4 & l Viet., c. 26, § 33 (1837); Eccles v. Cheyne, 2 K. & J.
676, 69 Eng. Rep. 954 (1856); Holyland v. Lewin, 26 Ch. D. 266 (1884); Lyndall's Estate, 2 Pa. D. & C. 476, 32 W. N. C. 325 (1893); Thompson v. Pew, 214
Mass. 520, 102 N. E. 122 (1913); Daniel v. Brown, 156 Va. 563, 159 S. E. 209
(1931); 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 350 (1940); l SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,
§ 267 (1936). On special powers see: Griffiths v. Gale, 12 Sim. 354, 59 Eng. Rep.
u68 (1844); Freeland v. Pearson, L. R. 3 Eq. 658 (1867).
189
Wills Act, 7 W. 4 & 1 Viet., c. 26, § 25 (1837); Holyland v. Lewin, 26
Ch. D. 266 (1884).
140
Eccles v. Cheyne, 2 K. & J. 676 at 682, 69 Eng. Rep. 954 (1856); In re
Wilkinson, L. R. 4 Ch. 587 at 589-590 (1869); Re Wallinger's Estate, [1898]
l I. R. 139 at 148; Re Jacob, [1907] l Ch. 445 at 449; Re Doherty-Waterhouse,
[1918] 2 Ch. 269 at 271-272.
141
[1891] 3 Ch. 474, discussed supra at note 59 et seq.
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5. Problems of Fiduciary Duties of Donee
There are certain doctrines which apply only to special powers
because fiduciary duties are owed by the donee to the designated obj ects or to the donor in connection with the selection among designated
objects. If there are no designated obj~cts, i.e., if the power is general,
it is not possible to impose these fiduciary duties on the donee. These
doctrines are:
(a) Some special powers are powers in the nature of or coupled
with a trust, the distinctive feature of which is that their exercise is
imperative and not merely in the discretion of the donee.142 Whether
a power is imperative depends on the donor's intention.148
(b) In English law all powers are releasable.144 In the United
States there is a conflict of opinion as to which special powers may be
released by the donee,145 but there is agreement as to general powers.
They are releasable.146 "It is true ... because the donee does not owe
any duty to anyone with respect to the power; it is intended for his
benefit, and he is not a fiduciary." 147
( c) There is a difference of opinion on the question whether,
and, if so, which, special powers may be delegated,148 but it is agreed
that normally a general power may be exercised by conferring on the
donee another power.149
( d) In English law, a general power given to the survivor of two
persons may be exercised by the will of the survivor executed during
their joint lives. 150 A special power cannot be exercised until the sur142 Burrough v. Philcox, 5 Myl. & Cr. 72, 41 Eng. Rep. 299 (1840); Gorin
v. Gordon, 38 Miss. 205 (1859); Re Weekes' Settlement, [1897] I Ch. 289; Cady
v. Lincoln, 100 Miss. 765, 57 So. 213 (1912); Stoughton v. Liscomb, 39 R. I.
489, 98 A. 183 (1916); Re Combe, [1925] Ch. 210.
143 Milhollen's Admr. v. Rice, 13 W. Va. 510 (1878). See note 37, supra.
144 Except powers in trust. Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20 § I 55 ( I 92 5).
145 Gray, "Release and Discharge of Powers," 24 HARV. L. REV. 511 ( 19 I 1) ;
I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, §§ 277-285 (1936); 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§
334-338 (1940) [see, in particular, the memorandum appended to Tentative Draft
No. 7 (1937)].
146 Johnson v. Harris, 202 Ky. 193, 259 S. W. 35 (1924); Lyon v. Alexander,
304 Pa. 288, 156 A. 84 (1931); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, (Tentative Draft No.
7), § 457 (1937).
147 Simes, "Powers in Trust and the Termination of Powers by the Donee," 37
YALE L. J. 63, 211 at 217-218 (1927).
148
See note 33, supra.
149
3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 357 (1940), and cases cited in note 33, supra.
150
Thomas v. Jones, I De G. J. & S. 63, 46 Eng. Rep. 25 (1862); FARWELL,
PoWERS, 3d ed., 177-179 (1916).

376

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

vivor is actually ascertained.151 The donee of a special power is a
fiduciary, and, therefore, may not decide upon the appointment until
such time as is indicated by the donor.152
(e) In the United States the court refuses both specific performance and damages for the breach or threatened breach of a covenant to
exercise a testamentary power, whether the power be general or special.153 In England, if the power is special, there is no remedy for
breach or threatened breach of a covenant, but if the power is general,
damages are recoverable for breach.154 The donee of a special power
owes fiduciary duties which he may not compromise by a premature
judgment on the destination of the property subject to the power.
(f) The doctrines of illusory appointments,155 fraud upon a
power,156 and excessive appointments 157 apply to special but not to
general powers.158
151 MacAdams v. Logan, 3 Bro. C. C. 310, 29 Eng. Rep. 553 (1791); Cave v.
Cave, 8 De G. M. & G. 131, 44 Eng. Rep. 339 (1856); Re Twiss's Trust, 15 W.,R.
540 (1867); Re Moir's Settlement Trusts, 46 L. T. R. 723 (1882); SUGDEN,
PowEtis, 8th ed., 124 (1861); FARWELL, PoWERs, 3d ed., 183 (1916). Would the
distinction be made by an American court? See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 344
(1940).
152 Re Moir's Settlement Trusts, 46 L. T. R. 723 (1882).
153 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§ 339, 340 (1940); Northern Trust Co. v.
Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N. E. (2d) 487 (1938).
154 Thacker v. Key, L. R. 8 Eq. 408 (1860); Re Parkin, [1892] 3 Ch. 510;
Re Bradshaw, [1902] 1 Ch. 436; Re Lawley, [1902] 2 Ch. 673, 799, affd. sub
nom. Beyfus v. Lawley, [ I 903] A. C. 41 I.
155 The doctrine was abolished in England by I I Geo. 4 & I Will. 4, c. 46
(1830), a statute sponsored by Lord St. Leonards. The doctrine is still applied in
some states. See note 39, supra.
156 See note 38, supra. Aleyn v. Belchier, I Eden 132, 28 Eng. Rep. 634
(1758); Daubeny v. Cockburn, I Mer. 626, 35 Eng. Rep. 801 (1816); Cloutte v.
Storey, [1911] I Ch. 18; Central Trust Co. v. Dewey, 179 App. Div. II2, 166
N. Y. S. 214 (1917); Taylor v. Phillips, 147 Ga. 761, 95 S. E. 289 (1918);
Cochrane v. Cochrane, [1922] 2 Ch. 230; Easley v. Little, 314 Ill. 553, 145 N. E.
625 (1924); Re Nicholson's Settlement, [1939] Ch. II.
157 Introductory Note to §§ 474, 478, PROPERTY RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final
Draft No. 2), pp. 12, 60, 78 (1938); 2 CHANCE, A TREATISE ON PowERs, c. xii,
§ vi (1841); FARWELL, PowERs, 3d ed., 343-374 (1916); I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 274 (1936).
158 For further differences between general and special powers, see: (1) Judgments. Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 195 (1925). (2) Vesting in personal
representatives. Administration of Estates Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 2 3, §§ I (I), 3 ( 2)
(1925). (3) Vesting in trustees. LEWIN, TRUSTS, 14th ed., 468-469 (1939), and
cases there cited. (4) Satisfaction of charges on property. Administration of Estates
Act, 15 Geo. 5~ c. 23, § 35(1) (1925). (5) Conflict of laws. Pouey v. Hordern,
[1900] I Ch. 492; Re Pryce, [19u] 2 Ch. 286. (6) Limitation of actions. Limitation Act, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, § I (1833); Limitation Act, 37 & 38 Viet., c. 57, §§
I, 9 (1874); Re Earl of Devon's Settled Estates, [1896] 2 Ch. 562. (7) Appointments
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Since the above rules are based on the existence of fiduciary duties,
and since these in turn depend on the existence of designated objects,
it is clear that these rules can apply to one only of the three "anomalous"
powers here discussed. This is the power to appoint to a limited class
which includes the donee. In the case of the power to appoint to anyone except the donee or the power to appoint to anyone except certain
named individuals there are no designated objects. The rest of humanity cannot be considered to constitute designated objects by reason of the
specific exclusions. It is, however, possible to apply the doctrines of
fraud upon a power and excessive appointments to these two powers.
This is so because these doctrines are intended to prevent, among other
improprieties, appointments to non-objects,159 and the excluded persons, of course, are non-objects.
to personal representatives of deceased persons. Maddison v. Andrew, I Ves. Sen. 57
at 59, 27 Eng. Rep. 889 (1747); see note 26, supra. (8) Stamp duty on conveyances.
Finance (1909-10) Act, IO Edw. 7, c. 8, § 74 (1910); Stanyforth v. Commissioners,
[1930] A. C. 339; 2 EMMET, NoTES ON PERUSING TITLE, 12th ed., 261-262
(1932).
For a summary of most of the recent developments in English law relating to
powers, see 174 L. T. 397, 420, 440, 460, 485, 503 (1932), 175 L. T. 3, 24, 44
(1933).
159
Carver v. Bowles, 2 Russ. & My. 301, 39 Eng. Rep. 409 (1831); Kampf v.
Jones, 2 Keen. 756, 48 Eng. Rep. 821 (1837); Harvey v. Stracey, I Drew. 73, 61
Eng. Rep. 379 (1852); Cruse v. McKee, 2 Head. (39 Tenn.) 1 (1858); Horwitz
v. Norris, 49 Pa. St. 213 (1865); Re Kerr's Trusts, 4 Ch. D. 600 (1877); In re
Farncombe's Trusts, 9 Ch. D. 652 (1878); Re Witty, [1913] 2 Ch. 666; Re Carter's Estate, 254 Pa. 565, 99 A. 79 (1916); Re Boulton's Settlement Trust, [1928]
Ch. 703.

